The heterogeneity of experiential imagination by Dokic, Jérôme & Arcangeli, Margherita
The Heterogeneity of Experiential 
Imagination
Jérôme Dokic & Margherita Arcangeli
Imagination is very often associated with the experienceable. Imagination is said
to “re-create” conscious experiences. For instance, philosophers often talk of vis-
ion-like or audition-like imagination. How many varieties of experiential imagina-
tion are there, and how are they related? In this paper, we offer a detailed tax-
onomy of imaginative phenomena, based on both conceptual analysis and phe-
nomenology, which contributes to answering these questions. First, we shall spell
out the notion of experiential imagination as the imaginative capacity to re-create
experiential perspectives. Second, we suggest that the domain of experiential ima-
gination divides into objective and subjective imagination. In our interpretation,
objective imagination comprises both sensory and cognitive imagination. In con-
trast,  subjective  imagination  re-creates  non-imaginative  internal  experiences of
one’s own mind, including proprioception, agentive experience, feeling pain, and
perhaps internal ways of gaining information about other types of mental states,
such as sensory experience and belief. We show how our interpretation of the no-
tion of subjective imagination differs from Zeno Vendler’s, who relies on an ortho-
gonal distinction between two ways in which the self is involved in our imagin-
ings. Finally, we show the relevance of our taxonomy for several important philo-
sophical and scientific applications of the notion of imagination, including modal
epistemology, cognitive resonance, mindreading and imaginative identification.
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1 Introduction
Many theorists have pointed out that imagina-
tion, or at least a salient type of imagination, is
bound to the “experienceable”.1 In this sense, we
can imagine only what can be experienced. For
1 This is a widespread claim that dates back to Plato and Aristotle
and pervades the history of philosophy. See White (1990) for a good
survey and a critical view of the standard picture (suggested by ety-
mology) according to which imagination is akin to perception only.
Among contemporary philosophers see also, for instance,  Wollheim
(1984), Williams (1976), Casey (1976), O’Shaughnessy (1980), Vend-
ler (1984),  Peacocke (1985),  Walton (1990),  Mulligan (1999),  Kind
(2001),  Currie &  Ravenscroft (2002),  Martin (2002),  Noordhof
(2002),  Chalmers (2002),  Carruthers (2002),  McGinn (2004),  Gold-
man (2006), Byrne (2010).
instance, we can visually imagine only what can
be seen and auditorily imagine only what can
be heard. To capture the latter examples, philo-
sophers  often talk  of  vision-like and audition-
like  imagination.  More  generally,  the  relevant
type of imagination is experience-like or (as we
shall also say)  experiential, whether or not one
believes that experiential imagination exhausts
the field of possible imaginings.
However, the precise sense in which ima-
gination  is  experiential  remains  a  deep  and
complicated issue. In this essay, we would like
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to inquire into the scope of experiential imagin-
ation. In particular, we want to relate the no-
tion of experiential imagination to two import-
ant distinctions present in the contemporary lit-
erature on imagination, namely the distinction
between  sensory  and  cognitive  imagination
(Currie & Ravenscroft 2002; McGinn 2004) and
the distinction between subjective and objective
imagination  (Vendler 1984;  Dokic 2008).  We
aim at proposing, eventually, a systematic and
hopefully enlightening taxonomy of the varieties
of experiential imagination.
The essay is structured as follows: Section
2 tackles the broad phenomenological sense in
which our imaginings are experiential. Sensory
imagination will  emerge as an important sub-
type of experiential imagination.
Section  3 individuates  two  more  funda-
mental sub-species of experiential imagination,
namely  objective  and  subjective  imagination.
We shall  point out that this distinction maps
onto an independently motivated distinction in
the  field  of  non-imaginative  mental  states,
namely that between external and internal ex-
periences.  While external experiences (such as
vision) are only accidentally  de se, internal ex-
periences  (such  as  proprioception  or  agentive
experience) are essentially or at least normally
de se. The upshot will be that sensory imagina-
tion is best seen as a paradigmatic case of ob-
jective imagination.
Section 4 discusses the distinction between
objective  and  subjective  imagination,  as  Zeno
Vendler introduces it on the basis of intuitive
contrast examples. We shall show that Vendler’s
distinction diverges from ours, since it seems to
hinge on a distinction between two ways the self
can be involved in our imaginings. We shall sug-
gest that the latter distinction is in fact ortho-
gonal to our distinction between objective and
subjective imagination (section  4.1). Moreover,
upon closer look, the contrast examples offered
by Vendler motivate our construction of the ob-
jective versus subjective distinction, which will
prove to be more fruitful for the theory of ima-
gination (section 4.2).
Section  5 presents the notion of cognitive
or belief-like imagination and gives some reason
to resist its interpretation as a form of non-ex-
periential  imagination.  Cognitive  imagination
can be construed as experiential, provided that
at least some of our occurrent beliefs are con-
scious. Moreover, if belief is an experience, it is
clearly an external experience. Therefore,  cog-
nitive imagination will emerge as a sub-species
of  objective  imagination,  along  with  sensory
imagination.
Section  6 further investigates the domain
of subjective imagination and its heterogeneity.
We shall  suggest that,  along with propriocep-
tion,  agentive  experience,  introspection,  and
feeling pain, subjective imagination may re-cre-
ate other internal ways of gaining information
about one’s mental states, including beliefs.
Although much of  our discussion in  this
essay  belongs  to  conceptual  clarification  in-
formed by phenomenological considerations, sec-
tion  7 briefly describes several upshots of our
account  with  respect  to  modal  epistemology,
cognitive  resonance  phenomena,  mindreading,
and imaginative identification. It is our conten-
tion that the relevance of  the conceptual  dis-
tinctions proposed by our taxonomy of experi-
ential imagination has been crucially neglected
in many important philosophical and scientific
applications of the notion of imagination. 
2 Experiential and sensory imagination
Let us start with Christopher Peacocke’s ana-
lysis of imagination, which can help us to delin-
eate what  we mean by “experiential  imagina-
tion.”  Peacocke (1985)  puts  forward  what  he
calls the “General Hypothesis” about imagina-
tion, or GH (General Hypothesis) for short:
GH =Df To imagine something is always at
least to imagine, from the inside, being in
some  conscious  state  (Peacocke 1985,  p.
21).
Peacocke does not offer an explicit definition of
the phrase “from the inside”, but we shall follow
Kendall  Walton’s  interpretation  and  assume
that “the question of whether an imagining is
from the inside arises only when what is ima-
gined  is  an  experience  (broadly  construed)”
(Walton 1990, p. 31). For instance, I may ima-
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gine being a descendant of Napoleon, but, ac-
cording to Walton, my imagining does not es-
sentially involve the perspective of any experi-
ence properly speaking. There is nothing it is
like to be a descendant of Napoleon.2 So there is
no question of imagining “from the inside” hav-
ing this relational property. In contrast, when I
visually imagine a white sandy beach, my ima-
gining  involves  an  experiential  perspective.  I
imagine “from the inside” a specific visual ex-
perience.
Peacocke’s  notion  of  imagining  from the
inside is broadly related to other notions in the
philosophical literature on imagination. For in-
stance, Gregory Currie and Ian Ravenscroft in-
troduce the notion of  recreative imagination as
the capacity to have “states that are not per-
ceptions or beliefs or decisions or experiences of
movements of one’s body, but which are in vari-
ous ways like those states—like them in ways
that enable the states possessed through ima-
gination to mimic and, relative to certain pur-
poses, to substitute for perceptions, beliefs, de-
cisions, and experiences of movements” (Currie
&  Ravenscroft 2002,  p.  12).  Similarly,  Alvin
Goldman puts forward the notion of enactment
imagination (or E-imagination) as “a matter of
creating or trying to create in one’s own mind a
selected mental state, or at least a rough fac-
simile of such a state, through the faculty of the
imagination” (Goldman 2006, p. 42).3
Many  other  philosophers  have  held  the
view  that  imagination  is  the  capacity  to
“modify” non-imaginative kinds of mental state
(Husserl 1901;  Meinong 1902;  Mulligan 1999;
Weinberg &  Meskin 2006a,  2006b), where the
relevant modification is to be understood as the
“preservation” of some features of the non-ima-
ginative states, such as part of their functional
roles, despite phenomenological discrepancies or
different  overall  cognitive  underpinnings.  This
view is independent of a strong kind of simula-
tionism,  according  to  which  each  of  several
types of imagination shares with a proper non-
imaginative counterpart some cognitive mechan-
2 Throughout  the  paper,  we assume that  experiences  are  conscious
mental states.
3 Goldman himself acknowledges that these two treatments of imagina-
tion are similar (Goldman 2006, p. 52, fn. 21).
ism (or set of information-processing systems),
which is redeployed off-line.
To recapitulate, according to the termino-
logy used in this essay, imagination is the gen-
eral capacity to produce  sui generis occurrent
mental  states,  which  we  call  “imaginings”.
Whenever a subject imagines something, she is
in a particular mental state of imagining. What
type of mental state the subject is in depends
on the non-imaginative conscious state that is
re-created. Here we want to remain as neutral
as  possible  with  respect  to  the  relationship
between imaginings and their analogues in the
non-imaginative mental realm. It is enough for
our  purposes  to  accept  the  idea  that  a  phe-
nomenologically useful taxonomy of imagination
can be guided by a corresponding taxonomy of
non-imaginative mental states (and perhaps also
the other way around, as we shall suggest to-
ward the end of the essay).
From now on, instead of using Peacocke’s
phrase “imagining from the inside”, which is po-
tentially misleading (see footnote 16 below), we
are  going  to  use  phrases  of  the  form “X-like
imagination”, or “re-creating X” in imagination,
where X is a type of non-imaginative state (as
in  “vision-like  imagination”,  or  “re-creating  a
proprioceptive experience”). However, our use of
these phrases should not be interpreted as car-
rying all  the  commitments of  simulationist  or
recreative theories of  imagination (whence the
presence of the hyphen in “re-creating”).
GH turns out to be a general definition of
imagination as essentially involving the perspect-
ive of a conscious experience—precisely what we
call “experiential imagination”. Peacocke then in-
troduces a more specific hypothesis precisely in
order to identify sensory imagination as a sub-do-
main of experiential imagination.4 He himself calls
this  hypothesis  the  “Experiential  Hypothesis”,
4 What is the relationship between sensory imagination and mental
imagery? The latter phenomenon is at the heart of the well-known
debate  about  the  format  of  representations  involved  in  cognitive
tasks such as mental rotation (see  Kosslyn 1980,  1994;  Tye 1991;
Pylyshyn 2002; Kosslyn et al. 2006). This debate concerns the kind
of  content of the relevant representations, and one of the issues is
whether such content is propositional or iconic. In contrast, the no-
tion of sensory imagination is defined here by reference to the psy-
chological  mode of the re-created mental state, namely a conscious
perceptual  experience.  For  our  purposes  we  can  leave  open  the
nature of the contents of sensory imaginings.
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but in order to avoid confusion and make it clear
that only sensory imagination is at stake, we are
going  to  call  it  the  “Sensory  Hypothesis”  (or
Sensory Hypothesis (SensH) for short), and reph-
rase it as follows:
SensH =Df To imagine something sensorily
is always at least to re-create some sensory
experience.
For  instance,  imagining  being  in  front  of  the
Panthéon or at the helm of a yacht (Peacocke’s
examples) may involve re-creating some visual ex-
perience as of being in front of the Panthéon or at
the helm of the yacht.
Sensory imagination is not confined to vis-
ion. In Peacocke’s words, SensH deals with “ima-
ginings describable pre-theoretically as visualiza-
tions, hearings in one’s head, or their analogues in
other modalities” (Peacocke 1985, p. 22).5 A sim-
ilar  definition  of  sensory  imagination  can  be
found in the work of  other philosophers  (Kind
2001;  Noordhof 2002;  McGinn 2004). The same
type of imagination has also been labeled “per-
ception-like” (Currie &  Ravenscroft 2002), “per-
ceptual imagination” (Chalmers 2002), and even
“experiential imagination” (Carruthers 2002).
To the extent that SensH is concerned only
with cases in which the subject re-creates a spe-
cific type of experience, namely sensory experi-
ence, it deals with a sub-type of experiential ima-
gination as covered by GH, namely sensory ima-
gination. At this point, the question arises as to
what other types of experiential imagination there
are  beyond  the  sensory  type.  Walton  suggests
that  the  notion  of  experience  at  stake  in  GH
should be interpreted in a broad way, and we may
wonder about its precise breadth.
3 Objective and subjective imagination
Peacocke himself intends GH to cover genuine in-
stances of experiential imagination that are not
covered by SensH—what we shall call non-sensory
5 At this point we can count at least the five senses (vision, audition,
touch, taste, and olfaction) as sensory modalities. Later on, we shall
suggest that a sensory modality involves an external perceptual per-
spective on the world. This excludes proprioception and the sense of
agency as sensory modalities, insofar as they involve  internal per-
spectives on oneself.
imagination. For instance, one can imagine “the
conscious,  subjective  components  of  intentional
action”  (Peacocke 1985,  p.  22).  On  Peacocke’s
view,  imagining  playing  the  Waldstein  sonata
may involve re-creating a non-sensory experience,
namely the intimate experience one has of one’s
own action while or in acting.
Of  course,  the precise  nature of  what we
may call “motor imagery” is controversial.6 Currie
and Ravenscroft suggest that “motor images have
as their counterparts perceptions of bodily move-
ments. They have as their contents active move-
ments of one’s body” (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002,
p. 88). So on Currie and Ravenscroft’s suggestion,
imagining playing the Waldstein sonata involves
re-creating the perception of bodily movements.
Certainly, in order to imagine performing an
action, it is not enough to re-create a  visual ex-
perience of the appropriate bodily movements—
otherwise, the relevant type of imagining would
belong to sensory imagination after all. Alternat-
ively, one might suggest that motor imagery in-
volves re-creating a  proprioceptive experience of
the appropriate bodily movements. However, such
imagining does not entail re-creating an agentive
experience, even if it may accompany the latter.
In a similar vein, Goldman claims that motor im-
agery “is the representation or imagination of ex-
ecuting bodily movement” and has as its counter-
part “events of motor production, events occur-
ring in  the motor cortex that  direct  behavior”
(Goldman 2006,  pp.  157–158).  Following Gold-
man,  we  can  say  that  imagining  playing  the
Waldstein sonata may involve re-creating an exe-
cution of the appropriate bodily movements.
In fact, an ordinary case of imagining play-
ing the Waldstein will probably involve (at least)
three types of imagining:
• Imagining seeing movements of one’s fin-
gers on the keyboard.
• Imagining having a proprioceptive experi-
ence of these movements.
• Imagining playing the sonata.
6 See section 7.2. As Thomas Metzinger reminded us, the existence of
motor  imagery has  been acknowledged by twentieth century phe-
nomenology. For instance, Karl Jaspers has coined the German term
“Vollzugsbewusstsein”,  which can be translated as “executive con-
sciousness”.
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The three  types  of  imagining  are  typically  en-
tangled  within  a  single  imaginative  endeavor.
That is, someone who imagines playing the son-
ata will typically imagine having a proprioceptive
experience of her fingers running on the keyboard
but also various sensory experiences: visual exper-
iences of her moving fingers and auditory experi-
ences of the music. Still, each type is essentially
distinct from the others, and might even be disso-
ciable in special circumstances (although we do
not want to insist too much on the possibility of
such dissociation). Suppose for instance that one
imagines one’s  limbs being  remotely controlled.
One can imagine from a proprioceptive perspect-
ive one’s arms and legs going through the motions
characteristic of playing the piano without ima-
gining oneself playing the piano. In this case, (ii)
is  instantiated but (iii) is not.  More controver-
sially, suppose that one imagines oneself being se-
lectively  anesthetized,  or  in  the  situation  of  a
deafferented subject.7 Perhaps one can then ima-
gine playing the piano without imagining having
a  proprioceptive  experience;  (iii)  but  not  (ii)
would be instantiated. Given the role of proprio-
ceptive feedback in the ordinary execution of ac-
tion, it is probably hard if not impossible to ima-
gine playing a whole sonata in the absence of any
proprioceptive-like  imagining,  but  the  relevant
dissociation is in principle possible for simpler ac-
tions, such as stretching one’s finger. Finally, it
seems  possible  to  imagine  playing  the  piano
without re-creating any visual or auditory experi-
ence. For instance, one can imagine playing the
sonata  with  one’s  eyes  closed  or  one’s  ears
blocked. Here, (iii) is instantiated but (i) is not.
Again, given the role of sensory feedback in the
ordinary execution of action, it might be hard to
form such a selective imagining, especially if the
action gets complicated.
The upshot  of  the  foregoing  discussion  is
that only (iii) is a genuine case of motor imagery.
It involves the re-creation of what philosophers of
action call the “sense of agency” or the “sense of
control”  (see  e.g.,  Haggard 2005 and  Pacherie
2007). Since the sense of agency or control is a
conscious experience, motor imagery clearly falls
under the umbrella  of  experiential  imagination.
7 Deafferented patients have lost the sense of proprioception; see e.g.,
Cole (1995) and Gallagher (2005).
Moreover, to the extent that motor imagery is (at
least in principle) dissociable from sensory ima-
gination, even if it typically depends on the latter,
it is a case of non-sensory imagination.8 
What about (ii)? Proprioception is arguably
a mode of perception; it is a way of perceiving the
spatial disposition of one’s body.9 In this respect,
(ii) is like (i), which is a case of sensory imagina-
tion. However, proprioception is also essentially or
at least normally a way of gaining information
about oneself; what proprioception is about is a
bodily state of oneself. In this respect, (ii) is more
like (iii), which also involves a way of gaining in-
formation about oneself, and more precisely one’s
actions.10
What unifies (ii) and (iii) as cases of non-
sensory imagination is the fact that what is re-cre-
ated is a (non-imaginative) internal experience. An
internal experience is essentially or at least nor-
mally de se, in the following sense: it is supposed
to be about a mental or bodily state of oneself.
Proprioceptive and agentive experiences are both
internal in this sense. At least in normal circum-
stances, one cannot have a proprioceptive experi-
ence of another’s body or a sense of agency for an-
other’s action. In contrast, all cases of sensory ima-
gination are such that what is re-created is a (non-
imaginative)  external experience. An external ex-
perience is typically about the external world and
is only accidentally de se. For instance, vision is an
8 Even if it turns out that motor imagery is constitutively dependent
on sensory imagination,  it  is  clearly  not  fully sensory,  as  we will
shortly show. Note also that if motor imagery can be conceived as
the re-creation of an essentially active phenomenon, namely the sense
of agency or control, it need not be itself active. Although we cannot
dwell on this issue here, imaginings can be either active, when we de-
liberately imagine something, or passive, as for instance when we are
lost in an episode of mind wandering (see footnote 22).
9 If proprioception is a case of perception, there must be proprioceptive ex-
periences. This has been contested, especially by Anscombe (1957). How-
ever, in our view, Anscombe conflates two different claims. The first
claim, which we accept, is that there are no proprioceptive  sensations.
Proprioception is not a case of sensory perception. The second claim,
which we reject, is that proprioception does not involve any conscious
experience. Even if there are no proprioceptive sensations, we are con-
sciously aware of the positions and movements of our body.
10 The idea that there are “self-informative methods,” i.e., ways of finding
out about oneself, is pervasive in John Perry’s theory of self-knowledge;
for a recent statement, see  Perry (2011). As Perry makes clear, these
methods can be either metaphysically or merely architecturally guaran-
teed. François Recanati makes use of a similar idea in his account of per-
spectival thought (Recanati 2007) and mental files (Recanati 2012); for
instance, he writes: “In virtue of being a certain individual, I am in a po-
sition to gain information concerning that individual in all sorts of ways
in which I can gain information about no one else, e.g. through proprio-
ception and kinaesthesis” (Recanati 2007, p. 262). 
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external experience; it is a way of gaining informa-
tion about one’s immediate surroundings, whether
or not one also sees oneself.11
These  considerations  allow  us  to  give  a
more fine-grained analysis of the realm of exper-
iential  imagination  based  on  the  external
versusinternal contrast, rather than the sensory
versus non-sensory contrast.  In a nutshell,  we
11 This is an oversimplification, since many ordinary experiences have
presumably both internal  and external aspects. On the one hand,
vision might involve both exteroception and interoception (Gibson
1966). On the other hand, proprioception and other forms of bodily
experience  often  rely  on  visual  information  (Botvinick &  Cohen
1998; de Vignemont 2013). Still, the external aspect of many ordin-
ary  visual  experiences  is  clearly  dominant,  while  visually  aided
proprioception  remains  essentially  a  way  of  gaining  information
about oneself, and thus is an internal experience in our sense.
can say that experiential imagination comes in
two varieties. Experiential imagination can re-
create:  (a)  some  external  experience—e.g.,  a
way  of  gaining  information  about  the  world
(e.g., I imagine  seeing Superman flying in the
air), and (b) some internal experience—e.g., a
way of gaining information about oneself (e.g., I
imagine  having  a  proprioceptive  experience  of
flying  in  the  air).  Following  Jérôme Dokic
(2008), we shall call (a) “objective imagination”
and (b) “subjective imagination”; see figure 1.12
12 To  make  our  terminology  as  clear  as  possible,  the  distinction
between internal and external experiences concerns the realm of non-
imaginative states, while the analogous distinction between subject-
ive  and  objective  imagination  concerns  the  realm  of  imaginative
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We may thus introduce two other  hypo-
theses  subordinate  to  GH,  which  we  call  the
Objective Hypothesis (ObjH) and the Subject-
ive Hypothesis (SubjH):
ObjH  =Df To  imagine  something  object-
ively is always at least to re-create some
external experience.
SubjH =Df To imagine something subject-
ively is always at least to re-create some
internal experience.
Sensory  imagination  forms  an  important  sub-
class of experiential imagination, but it can also
be seen as a paradigmatic case of objective ima-
gination,  since  it  involves  re-creating  an  ex-
ternal experience.  Experiential  imagination  is
not merely objective imagination, since another
sub-class  of  experiential  imagination,  namely
subjective imagination, is  constituted by cases
in  which  an  internal experience  is  re-created.
For  instance,  imagining  having  one’s  legs
crossed or driving a Ferrari may involve re-cre-
ating  some  internal  non-sensory  experience,
namely a proprioceptive and/or agentive experi-
ence as of having one’s legs crossed or driving a
Ferrari.
To sum up, we have identified two import-
ant varieties of imagination that seem to exhaust
the domain of experiential imagination: objective
and  subjective  imagination.13 We  have  argued
that  this  distinction,  which  gives  rise  to  phe-
nomenologically different imaginings, traces back
to an independent distinction within the domain
of non-imaginative experiences, between external
and internal experiences.  We have also claimed
that sensory imagination, which is the variety of
experiential  imagination  most  commonly  recog-
nized, should be seen as a paradigmatic example
of  objective  imagination.  More  should  be  said
about the distinction between objective and sub-
jective imagination. For instance, questions arise
as to whether sensory imagination exhausts the
field of objective imagination and as to whether
states. The question of whether imaginings themselves can be said to
be internal or external is not raised in this essay.
13 Note that our definition leaves open the possibility that a particular ima-
gining is both objective and subjective, to the extent that the re-created
experience has both external and internal aspects (see footnote 11). 
subjective  imagination  encompasses  more  than
proprioceptive or agentive experiences.
The remainder of the paper is devoted to
further  clarification  of  the  notions  of  objective
and subjective imagination. We shall begin with a
comparison between our own proposal and Zeno
Vendler’s observations about imagination.
4 Vendler’s varieties of imagination
A well-informed reader might think that our dis-
tinction between objective and subjective imagin-
ation is the same as a homonymous distinction in-
troduced by Vendler (1984). Certainly Vendler in-
tends to capture two phenomenologically different
ways of imagining, which potentially correspond
to our distinction between external and internal
experiential  perspectives  (perspectives  on  the
world and perspectives on oneself). However, he
also gives a prima facie interpretation of the dis-
tinction between objective and subjective imagin-
ation, which has more to do with the way the self
is involved in our imaginings than with the dis-
tinction  between  external  and  internal  experi-
ences. On this interpretation, Vendler’s notions of
objective and subjective imagination arguably di-
verge from ours. Let us start with Vendler’s inter-
pretation of these notions (section 4.1) and then
move  to  a  deeper  analysis  of  the  contrast  ex-
amples offered by Vendler in order to motivate his
distinction  (section  4.2).  In  so  doing,  we  shall
show that our construction of the objective versus
subjective distinction is more helpful in order to
map the realm of experiential imagination. 
4.1 Two kinds of self-involvement
Vendler (1984) suggests that the phrase “S ima-
gines doing A” invites what he calls “subject-
ive” imagination, while the phrase “S imagines
herself/himself doing A” can be used to describe
“objective”  imagination.  Prima  facie,  Vendler
seems to interpret the distinction between sub-
jective  and  objective  imagination  in  terms  of
two ways in which the self can be involved in
our imaginings—implicitly or explicitly.
Subjective  imagination  concerns  cases  in
which the self is implicitly involved in the ima-
gining, whereas objective imagination concerns
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cases in which the self is explicitly involved in
the imagining. This is why the phrase “imagin-
ing doing A”, which does not explicitly mention
the agent of the action A, is best used to de-
scribe  subjective  imagination,  whereas  the
phrase “imagining myself doing A”, which expli-
citly mentions myself as the agent of the action
A, is more suitable to the description of object-
ive imagination.
The self is implicitly involved in an ima-
gining when it fixes the point of view internal to
the imagined scene without being a constituent
of  that  scene.  One  can  imagine  seeing  the
Panthéon  from the  other  end  of  rue  Soufflot
without imagining oneself as another object in
the scene.  Still,  the scene is  imagined from a
specific point of view, as defined by a virtual
self. One can also imagine seeing oneself in front
of the Panthéon. In such a case, the self  is a
constituent of the imagined scene—it is  expli-
citly represented as a  part  of  the imagining’s
content.
Of course, when one imagines seeing one-
self  in front of  the Panthéon, one’s imagining
also involves the self implicitly. One imagines a
scene  from  the  perspective  of  a  virtual  self,
which is distinct from oneself as a constituent of
the  scene.  As  a  consequence,  Vendler  makes
clear that subjective and objective imagination
are  not  mutually  exclusive.  Commenting  on
Vendler’s  distinction,  François  Recanati  con-
curs, writing that “the objective imagination is
a  particular  case  of  the  subjective”  (Recanati
2007, p. 196).
It should be sufficiently apparent that the
distinction between implicit and explicit self-in-
volvement is  a matter of the imagining’s  con-
tent and more precisely deals with the issue of
how the self is involved in imagination. In con-
trast, the distinction between internal and ex-
ternal experiential perspectives has to do with
the mode re-created in imagination, respectively
an external and an internal experience. There-
fore, the two distinctions answer different ques-
tions and turn out to be orthogonal.
First,  objective  imagination  can  involve
the self either implicitly or explicitly (but not
both at the same time). This is easily seen by
considering  the  Panthéon  example.  Peacocke
himself suggests another relevant case. He ob-
serves that the phrase “imagining being seated
on a horse” is ambiguous between adopting the
point of view of the rider (namely oneself) and
adopting the point of view of someone else who
could see the rider (see Peacocke 1985, p. 23). If
the  relevant  perspective  is  that  of  the  rider
(namely oneself),  the self  need not  be a con-
stituent  of  the  imagined  scene—in  this  case
(where the rider does not see any part of her
body), it is implicitly involved in the imagining.
In contrast, if the relevant perspective embraces
oneself  as  the  rider,  the  self  is  explicitly  in-
volved; it figures in the content of the imagin-
ing.  However,  both  interpretations  involve
visual (i.e., external) perspectives, so what is at
stake is a distinction within  objective imagina-
tion rather than a contrast between subjective
and objective imagination.14
Second,  it  is  at least  arguable that  sub-
jective  imagination  can involve  the  self  either
implicitly or explicitly.  Suppose that one sub-
jectively imagines swimming in the ocean. One
may re-create the internal experience of  what
Marc Jeannerod &  Elisabeth Pacherie (2004)
call a “naked” intention (in action), which pre-
cisely does not involve an explicit representation
of the agent. In this case, no self is part of the
representational content of one’s imagining. One
subjectively  imagines  swimming  without  ima-
gining  the  agent  as  such,  whether  oneself  or
anyone else. However, one might also re-create a
more  complex internal  experience,  whose  con-
tent embraces oneself as the agent of the action
of swimming. Accordingly, in this case, the self
(oneself) is explicitly represented in the content
of one’s subjective imagining. One subjectively
imagines a particular agent swimming; in Vend-
ler’s example, that particular agent is oneself.
One  might  object  to  the  last  point  and
claim that the self is never an object of internal
experience. One can have at best internal experi-
ences of particular mental states, such as inten-
14 One might object that both cases involve subjective imagination,
since the visual perspective of the rider, even if she does not see
her own body, is  tied to her proprioceptive experience;  see the
caveat voiced in footnote  11 above. Again, it might be that the
distinction  between  subjective  and  objective  imagination  has
really to do with the distinction between re-creating predomin-
antly  internal  and  re-creating  predominantly  external  experi-
ences.
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tions in action, but never of oneself having those
mental states. However, this is a substantial claim
that certainly needs to be backed up by careful
arguments. Note that the assumption that the self
can figure in the content of an internal experience
is in principle compatible with the Humean point
that the self  cannot be introspected. Introspec-
tion, conceived as a form of inner perception, is
only  one  type  of  internal  experience.  Perhaps
there are non-introspective cases of internal ex-
perience whose explicit contents cannot be fully
specified  except  by  using  the  first-person  pro-
noun. For instance, one might argue that at least
some cases of proprioception as well as internal
experiences of controlling one’s body as a whole
give us access  to one’s  self,  or  at least  to  the
boundaries between oneself and the rest of the en-
vironment.15
Consider other examples offered by Vendler.
When you imagine  yourself  eating a lemon by
imagining your pinched face,  your imagining is
15 For  relevant  discussion,  see  e.g.,  Cassam (1999),  Bermúdez et  al.
(1995), Bermúdez (1998), Metzinger (2003), and Peacocke (2014).
explicitly self-involving and might be fulfilled via
objective imagination, such as visual imagination,
but  also  via  subjective  imagination,  such  as
proprioceptive imagination, at least to the extent
that it recreates an internal experience of your
bodily self. What about imagining implicitly in-
volving  the  self?  If  while  imagining  eating  a
lemon, the subject imagines the action of eating a
lemon and nothing else, she is exploiting her sub-
jective imagination, insofar as she is re-creating
an agentive perspective. It seems possible to ima-
gine eating a lemon via objective imagination too,
for instance by re-creating a visual experience as
of an action independently of any identification of
the agent.
To sum up, while the distinction between
subjective and objective imagination seems to
capture two forms or modalities of imagination,
the  distinction  between  two  kinds  of  self-in-
volvement, although important in itself, is less
relevant to a taxonomy of experiential imagina-
tion. The orthogonality of these distinctions is
shown again in figure  2. In the following sub-
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section we shall further motivate our hypothesis
that Vendler’s own contrast examples are best
understood in terms of the independently mo-
tivated  distinction  between  internal  and  ex-
ternal experiences.
4.2 Vendler’s examples revisited
Aside from his interpretation of subjective ima-
gination as implicitly self-involving and object-
ive  imagination  as  explicitly  self-involving,
Vendler clearly draws our attention to two ways
of imagining a given action, which have quite
different phenomenological profiles. In his own
words:
We are looking down upon the ocean from
a cliff. The water is rough and cold, yet
there are some swimmers riding the waves.
‘Just  imagine  swimming  in  that  water’
says my friend, and I know what to do.
‘Brr!’, I say as I imagine the cold, the salty
taste, the tug of the current, and so forth.
Had he said ‘Just imagine yourself swim-
ming in that water’, I could comply in an-
other way, too: by picturing myself being
tossed about, a scrawny body bobbing up
and  down in  the  foamy waste.  (Vendler
1984, p. 43)
As some of Vendler’s other examples show, the
relevant distinction is not restricted to imagin-
ing actions:
In order to familiarize yourselves with this
distinction, imagine eating a lemon (sour
taste), and then imagine yourself eating a
lemon  (pinched  face);  imagine  being  on
the rack (agony), and then yourself being
on  the  rack  (distorted  limbs);  imagine
whistling  in  the  dark  (sensation  of
puckered lips), and then yourself whistling
in the dark (distance uncertain, but com-
ing closer); and so forth. (Vendler 1984, p.
43)
It is not immediately clear what is common to
all cases of subjective or objective imagination
in Vendler’s examples. Consider the suggestion
that the relevant distinction can be explained at
the level of the  states represented by the ima-
ginings.  Subjective  imagination  would  involve
imagining states  that  cannot be imagined ob-
jectively. For instance, in imagining swimming
in the water, I also imagine proprioceptive ex-
periences,  which (one might argue) cannot be
imagined  objectively.  How  could  we  visually
imagine such experiences, which are essentially
felt?
However, it is not obvious that the essence
of  the  distinction  between  subjective  and ob-
jective imagination can be fully captured by ref-
erence to the imagined states. One can imagine
having one’s legs crossed via subjective imagina-
tion,  but  also  via  objective  imagination.  The
first type of imagining is akin to proprioception
(one imagines feeling one’s legs crossed), while
the second type of imagining is akin to vision
(one visualizes oneself with one’s legs crossed).
Yet these imaginings are about the same bodily
condition—having one’s legs crossed.
Similarly,  the very same action of  swim-
ming in the ocean can be imagined subjectively
or objectively. The case of pain is more contro-
versial,  but if  one can be visually aware that
someone is  in pain (by observing pain-related
behavior), then one can imagine the very same
pain state either subjectively or objectively. The
difference between the relevant imaginings must
lie elsewhere.
We are now in the position to see that we
were on the right track and that Vendler’s con-
trast  examples  are  plausibly  construed  as  in-
volving  different  experiential  perspectives  on  a
given scene, either internal (perspectives on one-
self) or external (perspectives on the world). Sub-
jective imagination has to do with the former,
and objective imagination with the latter. This is
easily seen by considering the example of imagin-
ing whistling in the dark. Vendler contrasts the
subjective case, in which the subject imagines the
sensation of puckered lips, with the objective case,
in which the subject imagines the distance uncer-
tain,  but  coming  closer.  In  other  words,  what
Vendler seems to contrast is  proprioception-like
imagination with auditory imagination or, in our
terminology, an internal experiential  perspective
with an external one.
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More generally, Vendler seems to be con-
cerned with the difference between, on the one
hand,  imagining  doing  an  action  (e.g.,  swim-
ming,  eating,  whistling,  etc.)  or  having  pain
(e.g., agony), where what the imaginer re-cre-
ates is the relevant experience and, on the other
hand, imagining pieces of behaviour that reveal
the very same experience  (e.g.,  visualizing an
eating mouth or a body in agony), where what
the imaginer re-creates is an external perspect-
ive on the relevant experience.16
Let us note that, in order to make his con-
trast more realistic,  Vendler  gives  us complex
examples, where more than one experience is in-
volved. So for instance, his example of imagin-
ing swimming in the ocean clearly belongs to
subjective imagination, since the re-creation of
a proprioceptive and/or agentive experience is
involved.  As  Vendler  suggests,  though,  when
you fulfill this imagining you can also re-create
various external experiences, such as “the cold,
the salty taste, the tug of the current, and so
forth”. The same is true in the case of imagining
eating  a  lemon.  When  you  imagine  eating  a
lemon, you re-create in imagination an internal
experience  (e.g.,  the  proprioceptive  and/or
agentive experience of eating), but your imagin-
ing can be accompanied by others that re-create
external  experiences  (e.g.,  the  sour  taste,  the
yellow lemon).
The discussion of Vendler’s distinction has
led us to strengthen our taxonomy of experien-
tial imagination. So far we have seen that, first,
all cases covered by  SenH seem to be cases of
objective  imagination  (and  thus  covered  by
ObjH), which involves re-creating some external
experience. Second, all cases covered by  SubjH
arguably  involve  re-creating  some internal  ex-
perience.
However, another important type of ima-
gination emerges from the literature on imagin-
16 A similar point is made by Mike Martin when he draws a distinction
between “cases in which there is just an itch in the left thigh” in
imagination and cases “in which one imagines some person whose be-
haviour reveals that they have an itch” (Martin 2002, p. 406, fn. 35;
see also  Dorsch 2012). However, according to his terminology, only
the former cases count as being “from the inside”. Very often in the
literature, the phrase “imagining from the inside” is used in this nar-
row sense  (to  refer  to  subjective  imagination in  our  terminology)
more than the broad sense meant by Peacocke (which refers to ex-
periential imagination as a whole).
ation, namely cognitive imagination, which has
been defined as belief-like and typically contras-
ted with sensory or even experiential imagina-
tion.
5 Cognitive imagination
Many authors contrast sensory imagination with
cognitive imagination (“imagining that,” or “pro-
positional imagination”), which has been defined
as  belief-like  (Mulligan 1999;  Currie &
Ravenscroft 2002; McGinn 2004; Goldman 2006;
Weinberg &  Meskin 2006b;  Arcangeli 2011a).17
Cognitive  imagination  seems  to  be  relatively
autonomous  from  sensory  imagination.  For  in-
stance, one can imagine that poverty has been re-
duced in the world independently of re-creating
any visual, auditory, tactile, etc., experience. Of
course the autonomy of cognitive imagination rel-
ative to sensory imagination echoes the autonomy
of belief relative to sensory perception (one can
believe that poverty must be reduced in the world
without perceiving anything).
Cognitive  imagination  is  by  essence  non-
sensory, but given our previous discussion, it does
not exhaust the field of non-sensory imaginings.
Re-creating in imagination some internal experi-
ence is presumably non-cognitive (in the relevant
sense of being belief-like), but it is non-sensory as
well. Thus we have, at least  prima facie, three
types of potentially dissociable imagination: sens-
ory  non-cognitive  imagination  (e.g.,  I  imagine
hearing a piece of music, such as Ravel’s  Con-
certo pour la main gauche), non-sensory non-cog-
nitive  imagination  (e.g.,  I  imagine  having  the
proprioceptive  experience  of  being  one-armed),
and  non-sensory  cognitive  imagination  (e.g.,  I
imagine that Maurice Ravel has created a piano
piece especially for me).
One might argue that cognitive imagination
is not only non-sensory but non-experiential  as
17 In fact, Mulligan speaks of a judgement-like, rather than a belief-like,
type of imagination, which he calls “supposition”. It is not entirely
clear whether his notion of supposition can be equated with what we
call “cognitive imagination.” Very often in the literature, supposition
is taken to be belief-like and, as such, nothing but cognitive imagina-
tion (Nichols &  Stich 2003;  McGinn 2004;  Goldman 2006). An al-
ternative view is that supposition is a sui generis type of imagination
akin to acceptance rather than belief (Arcangeli 2011b). However, for
present purposes we will skip this issue and consider only belief-like
imagination.
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well and as such lies outside the scope of GH. Ac-
cording to a standard view, beliefs, even if they
can be occurrent, are not conscious experiences
strictly speaking. On this view, an occurrent be-
lief may be accompanied by various experiences
(mental  images,  feelings,  emotions,  etc.),  but
there is nothing it is like to have a belief.18 Now
this  view  has  recently  come  under  attack  by
philosophers who acknowledge the existence of a
doxastic  phenomenology,  i.e.,  a  kind  of  phe-
nomenology characteristic of  belief  (see the de-
bates  on cognitive  phenomenology in  Bayne &
Montague 2011). On this alternative view, there
is something it is like to have an occurrent belief,
which is reducible to neither sensory nor affective
phenomenology.  At least  some occurrent beliefs
would be sui generis conscious experiences.19
If  the alternative  view is  broadly  correct,
some beliefs lie within the scope of GH.20 In order
to  capture  cognitive  imagination  as  a  putative
form of experiential imagination, let us introduce
another  specific  hypothesis  subordinate to  GH,
which we call the Cognitive Hypothesis (C):
CogH =Df To  imagine  something  cognit-
ively is always at least to re-create a con-
scious occurrent belief.
For instance, cognitively imagining that quantum
physics is false or that this pen is an alien in-
volves re-creating the conscious occurrent belief
that quantum physics is false or that this pen is
an alien. In general, one may surmise that any-
thing that can be consciously believed can be cog-
nitively imagined.
We have suggested that experiential imagin-
ation divides into two sub-domains only, namely
subjective and objective imagination (covered by
SubjH and  ObjH,  respectively).  In addition,
sensory  imagination  (covered  by  SensH)
18 See  Metzinger (2003),  Tye (2009),  and  Carruthers &  Veillet
(2011).  Note that the standard view can lead to different atti -
tudes  toward the notion of  cognitive  imagination.  On one atti-
tude, cognitive imagination exists but is non-experiential. On an-
other attitude, cognitive imagination does not exist or wholly re-
duces to sensory imagination (if, for instance, it is construed as
auditory verbal imagination). 
19 Crane (2013) defends a closely related view, according to which episodes
of thinking, although not beliefs themselves, are phenomenally conscious.
CogH can easily be adapted to accommodate Crane’s view.
20 In conversation, Peacocke confirmed that he intends GH to cover at
least some cases of belief-like imagination.
emerged as  a  species  of  objective  imagination
and non-sensory non-cognitive types of imagina-
tion (e.g.,  proprioception-like and agentive-like
imagination)  have  been  described  as  paradig-
matic  cases  of  subjective  imagination.  What
about  cognitive  imagination  (covered  by
CogH)? Is it a type of objective or of subjective
imagination? Or should we acknowledge a third
class of experiential imaginings that are neither
objective nor subjective?21
We  have  introduced  the  distinction
between objective and subjective imagination as
the  imaginative  analogue  of  the  distinction
between external and internal experience. As we
have seen, many external experiences are ways
of  gaining  information  about  the  world,  and
many internal experiences are ways of gaining
information about oneself. Now one might claim
that  belief,  unlike  perceptual  or  introspective
experience, is not individuated in terms of ways
of gaining information. Of course some of our
beliefs result from various ways of gaining in-
formation about the world and ourselves, but it
is logically possible to have a belief that is not
the result of any source of information. Does it
follow that belief as an experience is neither ex-
ternal nor internal? Not really, for an external
experience has been more fundamentally defined
as being accidentally de se, whereas an internal
experience is essentially or at least normally de
se. In this more fundamental sense, if belief is
an experience, it is clearly an external experi-
ence: one can believe all sorts of states of affairs
that do not involve or concern oneself. It follows
that cognitive imagination, as the re-creation of
an external doxastic experience, is better seen
as a sub-species of objective imagination, along
with  sensory  imagination.  Objective  imagina-
tion then emerges as a heterogeneous domain,
but where at least two clearly different types of
imagining can be distinguished (see figure 3).
21 Moreover, the question of whether these varieties of imagination exhaust
the field of experiential imagination remains open. In order to answer it
we would have to inquire as to whether there are other types of imagina-
tion,  such  as  desiderative  or  desire-like  imagination  (see  Currie &
Ravenscroft 2002 and  Doggett &  Egan 2007 for a positive view, and
Weinberg & Meskin 2006a and Kind 2011 for a critical view), affective
or emotion-like imagination (see Goldman 2006 for a positive view, and
Currie & Ravenscroft 2002 for a critical view) and judgement-like or ac-
ceptance-like imagination (see footnote 17). For lack of space, we have to
defer this inquiry to another occasion.
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6 The scope of subjective imagination
As we have seen, subjective imagination involves
re-creating  various  ways  of  gaining  information
about ourselves, such as proprioceptive or agent-
ive experience. Now we also have ways of gaining
information about our own sensory experiences,
as well as about our own beliefs. We seem to be
able to form self-ascriptions of the form “I see x”
or “I believe that p” without relying on independ-
ent background beliefs. The nature of this ability
is  controversial.  Some  philosophers  claim  that
both sensory experiences and beliefs can be intro-
spected (e.g., Goldman 2006). Thus, we should be
open to the possibility of re-creating in imagina-
tion an introspective experience of a visual experi-
ence or an occurrent belief. Other philosophers re-
ject  the  notion  of  introspection  altogether  and
consider that self-ascription of sensory experience
or belief can follow a purely theoretical procedure
known as an “ascent routine” (see  Evans 1982
and Gordon 1995 for the case of belief, and Byrne
2010 for suggestions about how to extend the as-
cent routine to sensory experience).
The question arises as to what types of in-
ternal experience can be re-created in imagina-
tion, i.e., what the scope of subjective imagina-
tion is. In a sense, this question is hostage to an
independent theory of internal experience, ap-
propriate to sensory experience or belief. Obvi-
ously, we cannot settle the matter in this ex-
ploratory essay. Still, before moving to the pen-
ultimate section, we would like to suggest that
phenomenologically  accessible  distinctions
within the realm of imagination might be con-
ceived  as (usually  neglected)  constraints  on a
correct theory of internal experience. We shall
focus on belief, but similar observations can be
made for the case of sensory experience.
There is some phenomenological evidence
that subjective imagination can capture an in-
ternal perspective on at least some beliefs. Con-
sider an atheist who tries to imagine what it is
like to believe in God. One might argue that
this  involves  re-creating  some  internal  experi-
ence of an occurrent belief in God. At least the
atheist’s  imagining  seems  different  from  two
other types of imagining, namely imagining be-
lieving in God and imagining believing that one
believes in God.
First,  it  is  different  from  re-creating  in
imagination an occurrent belief in God, which
would be an example of cognitive imagination.
The latter imagining does not have belief as a
constituent of its content; one cognitively ima-
gines God himself,  rather than some belief in
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his existence. In general, an imagining that re-
creates  the non-imaginative state M need not
have M as part of its content; the imagining it-
self is an imaginative re-creation of M, but it is
not about M (Currie & Ravenscroft 2002, p. 27;
see also  Burge 2005, p. 63, for the correspond-
ing point about sensory imagination).  In con-
trast, the atheist’s imagining essentially has be-
lief as one of the constituents of its content; one
imagines a particular belief in God. A related
difference is that re-creating an occurrent belief
in God is re-creating an external experience of a
God-involving  world.  However,  the  atheist
might want to imagine what it is like to believe
in God without taking a stance on the presence
of God in the imaginary world. Her imagining is
focused on the belief in God, independently of
whether it is true or false (even though as an
atheist she believes it to be false).
Second, the atheist’s imagining is different
from re-creating an occurrent higher-order belief
that  one believes in  God,  i.e.,  imagining that
one believes in God. Intuitively, the former ima-
gining is more specific than the latter (which is
another example of cognitive imagination). Ima-
gining having the higher-order belief  that one
believes in God involves re-creating an external
experience of one’s belief in God. However, the
atheist  is  not  merely  imagining  that  she  or
someone else has a belief in God. She wants to
get  into  the  believer’s  mind  and  re-create  in
imagination an internal perspective on some oc-
current belief in God.
In the context of  GH, the apparent exist-
ence  of  cases  of  subjective  imagination  where
the re-created experience is an internal experi-
ence of belief can be seen as a constraint on a
correct account of the way we gain information
about  our  own  beliefs.  The  introspective  ac-
count can offer a straightforward explanation of
the atheist’s imagining as involving the re-cre-
ation of an introspective experience, as opposed
to a mere higher-order belief, about the belief in
God.  Prima  facie,  the  ascent-routine  account
has fewer resources to give justice to the relev-
ant phenomenology. It might not be impossible
to do so, though, if experiential imagination can
also re-create complex cognitive processes such
as going through an ascent routine. Again, we
have to leave the discussion for another occa-
sion. It is enough for our purposes to gesture to-
ward the possibility of extending the scope of
subjective  imagination  to  encompass  more  or
less  specific  internal  perspectives  on  beliefs,
even if further argument is certainly needed.
7 Some applications
In  this  penultimate  section,  we would  like  to
briefly  illustrate  how  the  fate  of  important
claims about imagination made by philosophers
and  scientists  depends  on  something  like  our
taxonomy of experiential imagination. Although
we believe that this taxonomy has philosophical
value  in  its  own right,  we also  would like  to
show that it  is  connected to central issues in
philosophy and cognitive science.  These issues
concern, respectively, modal epistemology (sec-
tion  7.1),  cognitive  resonance  (section  7.2),
mindreading (section 7.2), and imaginative iden-
tification (section  7.4). Our discussion in what
follows,  though,  can  only  be  rather  program-
matic in contrast to the rest of the essay.22
7.1 Modal epistemology
Imagination has been traditionally construed as
providing  evidence  for  modal  claims.  For  in-
stance, many philosophers since Descartes have
suggested that what can be imagined is meta-
physically possible. On the other hand, imagina-
tion has been shown to produce various sorts of
modal  illusions  (Kripke 1980;  Gendler &
Hawthorne 2002). The main challenge faced by
proponents of an internal relation between ima-
gination and possibility (perhaps via conceivab-
ility) is thus to distinguish proper and improper
22 This is only a selection of issues where we think our phenomeno -
logical and conceptual distinctions are relevant. We wish we had
space to discuss other topics of relevance to the theory of imagin -
ation,  such  as  mental  time  travel  (Schacter &  Addis 2007),
dreams (Windt 2014), and mind wandering (Metzinger 2013). For
instance, there are interesting issues having to do with the appar -
ent lack of reflexivity of mind wandering episodes, and the tend-
ency  for  the  mind  wanderer  to  identify  herself  with  imagined
protagonists  (Metzinger 2013).  A speculative hypothesis  is  that
the passivity of mind wandering episodes causes various metacog-
nitive errors, such as the error of confusing a case of subjective
imagination  with  a  genuine  case  of  internal  experience,  which
leads  the imaginer to self-identify with the subject of  the ima-
gined mental state. Again, we have to leave this fascinating issue
to another occasion.
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uses  of  imagination,  i.e.,  those  uses  that
provide,  and those that do not provide,  evid-
ence for modal claims. One might suggest, for
instance,  that  proper  uses  of  imagination  re-
quire  a  certain  format  that  other  uses  lack
(Nichols 2006; Weinberg & Meskin 2006b).
In  our  view,  there  is  an  additional  cri-
terion that must be taken into account in these
debates, which concerns the type of non-imagin-
ative  state  that  is  re-created  by  the  relevant
imaginings. It might be that only some types of
imagination  are  internally  related  to  modal
properties. For instance, it is not clear that cog-
nitive imagination is essentially related to pos-
sibility. Assuming the correctness of our claim
that cognitive imagination re-creates belief, the
fact that one can cognitively imagine that  p is
no more evidence that  p is  possible  than the
mere fact that one believes that p. After all, one
can  believe  all  sorts  of  metaphysically  im-
possible states of affairs (such as that Hesperus
and Phosphorus are distinct celestial bodies).
The challenge is then to identify the types
of imagination, if any, that are essentially or at
least reliably related to what is metaphysically
possible.  One  hypothesis,  voiced  by  Dokic
(2008), is to focus on types of imagination that
re-create states  of  (actual or potential)  know-
ledge. On this hypothesis, some uses of imagina-
tion  are  guides  to  possible  contents  because
they are guides to the possibility of knowing. To
the extent that sensory perception is commonly
thought to be a source of  knowledge,  sensory
imagination could be reliably linked to the pos-
sibility of what is imagined in this way (see also
Williamson 2008).
This is not to say that cognitive imagina-
tion has no role to play in providing evidence
for modal claims. Just as belief can be grounded
on sensory perception and thereby be counted
as knowledge, a single imagining might re-create
not only belief  and perception separately, but
the complex mental state of believing that p on
the basis of suitable sensory evidence (see Dokic
2008). The resulting imagining would be neither
purely sensory nor purely cognitive, but to the
extent that it re-creates a non-imaginative state
of  knowledge,  its  content  might  be  bound  to
what is metaphysically possible.
7.2 Cognitive resonance
If we are right, there is a phenomenologically ac-
cessible distinction between objective and subject-
ive imagination. What it is like to visually ima-
gine an action or a painful experience is typically
different from what it is like to subjectively ima-
gine acting or having pain. However, this distinc-
tion is rarely made explicit in the scientific literat-
ure on the neural underpinnings of imagination.
Let us consider the case of action. It has been a
remarkable discovery that observing and execut-
ing  an  action  involve  (at  least  sometimes)  the
same resonance system in the brain, and more
precisely the same “mirror neurons,” correspond-
ing to types of action such as grasping, reaching,
or eating (Rizzolatti et al. 1996; Rizzolatti et al.
2001).  What about imagining an action? Marc
Jeannerod claims that “imagining a movement re-
lies on the same mechanisms as actually perform-
ing  it,  except  for  the  fact  that  execution  is
blocked” (Jeannerod 2006, p. 28). Does this claim
concern objective imagination, subjective imagin-
ation, or both? On the one hand, his notion of
“motor imagery”, defined as “the ability to gener-
ate a conscious image of the acting self” (p. 23),
strongly suggests that he is talking about subject-
ive imagination. Motor imagery seems to underlie
the imaginative recreation of an internal experi-
ence of action, such as the intimate experience we
have while executing an action or controlling our
bodily movements. On the other hand, Jeannerod
makes clear that the “action representations” in-
volved in motor imagery can also operate during
action  observation  (p.  39).  To the  extent  that
visually imagining an action is analogous to ob-
serving an action, one may surmise that objective
imagination too involves the relevant action rep-
resentations.23
What we would like to know, of course, is
which action representations are common to both
objective and subjective imagination of an action,
and which action representations are specific to
23 There is also the interesting case of observing one’s own action in a mir-
ror. The question here is whether the observer is aware that she is ob-
serving her own action. If the answer is negative, then the re-creation of
the relevant experience belongs to objective imagination. If the answer is
positive, as for instances when one uses visual information to control
one’s action (think of a man shaving in front of the mirror), then the re-
creation of the relevant experience may also belong to subjective imagin-
ation (see footnote 11). 
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subjective  imagination.  Here  as  elsewhere,  we
think that  phenomenological  considerations  can
at  least  guide  scientific  investigations  into  the
neural underpinnings of our ability to imagine ac-
tions, whether imaginatively observed or imagin-
atively executed. 
7.3 Mindreading
We also think that much of the once-hot debate
between the “theory theory” and the “simula-
tion theory” of mindreading has missed the dis-
tinction between objective and subjective ima-
gination, or at least its significance. Mindread-
ing is often described as involving ways of “put-
ting oneself  in another person’s shoes” (Gold-
man 2006).  However,  as  many have observed,
that colloquial phrase can be used to refer to
two different projects. One might try to under-
stand either what one would do if one were in
the other’s situation or what the other will do.
The difference between these meanings has been
conceived  as  depending  on  whether  one  per-
forms the right “egocentric shift” and succeeds
in mimicking the other’s mind (Gordon 1995). If
we are right, there is another distinction thatis
crucial  to  simulation-based  mindreading,
namely the objective versus subjective imagina-
tion  distinction.  We  might  perform  the  right
egocentric shift but imaginatively re-create only
the other’s  external  experiences.  For instance,
we might imaginatively adopt the other’s visual
point of view and try to understand what he or
she is actually seeing. In doing so, though, we
imaginatively  adopt  a  perspective  that  is  not
necessarily the other’s perspective. Visual per-
spectives can be shared. It is only if we re-cre-
ate at least some of the other’s internal experi-
ences that we imaginatively adopt a perspective
that can only be that of the agent. Unlike ex-
ternal experiences,  internal experiences cannot
be shared. 
Why  is  it  important  for  the  success  of
mindreading that the mindreader re-creates also
internal experiences of the other person? Let us
consider  the case of  pain.  To the extent  that
both objectively and subjectively imagining an-
other person in pain may trigger the same res-
onance  (affective)  mechanisms,  we  can  argue
that they are on par with respect to the ima-
giner’s  understanding of the other’s experience
(Gallese 2003).  We  surmise  that  the  relevant
difference between objectively and subjectively
imagining the same painful experience concerns
the dynamics of mindreading. Recreating an in-
ternal  perspective  on  pain  will  spontaneously
give  rise  to  other  subjective  imaginings  in-
volving  the  recreation  of  the  mental  con-
sequences of pain in the other. Objective ima-
gination of another person in pain will likely de-
velop in different directions. For instance, if we
re-create a visual experience as of someone in
pain,  we  will  be  inclined  to  re-create  other
visual experiences of the consequences of pain.
More generally, someone who would be able to
re-create  only  external  experiences  of  pain
would be blind to the internal consequences of
pain. In contrast, subjective imagination prom-
ises to yield a better view of the other’s inner
life as it unfolds in time.
7.4 Imaginative identification
In this essay, we did not explicitly mention an
intriguing phenomenon in the field of imagina-
tion,  namely  our  ability  to  imagine  being
someone else, or imaginative identification. For
instance, we can imagine being Napoleon seeing
the desolation at Austerlitz and being vaguely
aware of one’s short stature (Williams 1976, p.
43). Recanati calls such cases “quasi-de se ima-
ginings”:
I will, therefore, coin the term ‘quasi-de se’
to refer to the first person point of view
type of thought one entertains when one
imagines, say, being Napoleon. The type of
imagining at stake is clearly first personal,
yet the imaginer’s self is not involved […].
The properties that are imaginatively rep-
resented  are  not  ascribed  to  the  subject
who  imagines  them,  but  to  the  person
whose  point  of  view  she  espouses.  (Re-
canati 2007, pp. 206–207)
How can  an  imagining  be  both  first-personal
and not genuinely (but only “quasi”)  de se? If
we can imagine being Napoleon just by recreat-
Dokic, J. & Arcangeli, M. (2015). The Heterogeneity of Experiential Imagination.
In T. Metzinger & J. M. Windt (Eds). Open MIND: 11(T). Frankfurt am Main: MIND Group. doi: 10.15502/9783958570085 16 | 20
www.open-mind.net
ing  his  visual  experience  of  the  desolation  at
Austerlitz,  it  is  not  obvious  that  quasi-de  se
imagination  is  necessarily  first-personal.  Since
visual  perspectives  can  be  shared,  our  visual
imagining can re-create anyone’s perspective. In
other words, objective imagination (i.e., the re-
creation of external perspectives) would not be
sufficient  to  generate  quasi-de  se imaginings.
Perhaps  Recanati  implicitly  ties  quasi-de  se
imagination  to  subjective  imagination  so  that
imagining being someone else involves the recre-
ation  of  at  least  some  internal  experience.
Again, in contrast to external perspectives, in-
ternal  perspectives  cannot  be  shared.  For  in-
stance,  a  subject  imagining  to  be  Napoleon
might, on the one hand, see in imagination the
desolation  at  Austerlitz  (i.e.,  an external  per-
spective is re-created) and, on the other hand,
be vaguely aware of his short stature and his
hand in his tunic (i.e., an internal, propriocept-
ive perspective is re-created).
In what sense  would subjective  imagina-
tion be first-personal,  then? One view is that
the quasi-de se case somehow derives from the
genuine  de  se case,  in  which  we  imagine
ourselves  having  various  external  and internal
experiences. On this view, there is an asymmet-
rical dependence between quasi-de se and genu-
ine de se imagination: even if the former is not
merely  a  type  of  the  latter,  imagining  being
someone else having such-and-such experiences
depends on the ability to imagine oneself having
these experiences.
However, our account of subjective ima-
gination suggests an alternative view, accord-
ing to which the identity of the subject need
not be built into a subjective imagining. Con-
sider the case of action again. The constraint
imposed  on  subjective  imagination,  that  the
imagined perspective  on the  action  can only
be that of the agent, leaves open whose self is
involved.  That  the  action  is  my  action,  or
someone  else’s,  is  an  additional  fact  in  the
imaginary  world.  In  other  words,  subjective
imagination can be neutral as to the identity
of the self that occupies the relevant internal
perspective. As a consequence, the same neut-
ral imagining can give rise to either quasi-de
se or genuine de se imagination, depending on
the imaginary project at stake.24 Subjectively
imagining  oneself  swimming and subjectively
imagining another person swimming both rest
on the same type of imagining, i.e., the recre-
ation of an internal experience of the action of
swimming. We take this neutrality to be a po-
tential advantage for our analysis of subjective
imagination.  Subjective  imagination  can  be
seen as a basis for the introduction of a notion
of self that is conceptually on a par with other
selves. In this respect, imagination acts as an
antidote to solipsism.
8 Conclusion
In this essay, we have tried to clarify what it
means to claim that imagination is experien-
tial. As we have seen, the notion of experien-
tial imagination is not unitary and refers to a
variety  of  phenomena.  We  have  focused  our
attention on four aspects of this notion. 
• First,  experiential  imagination  broadly
means  that  different  kinds  of  experiential
states are re-created in the imagination (al-
though we have remained silent about the
precise way in which the experiential states
are re-created).
• Second,  the  distinction  between  external
and  internal  experiences,  which  is  inde-
pendently  motivated  in  the  literature  on
non-imaginative  mental  states,  has  given
rise to a helpful sub-division of experiential
imagination into two different ways of ima-
gining:  objectively  and  subjectively.  Pace
Vendler, we have argued that this contrast
cannot  be  straightforwardly  aligned  with
two ways  in  which  the  self  is  involved  in
our  imaginings  (respectively,  explicitly,  or
implicitly).
• Third,  the  literature  commonly  acknow-
ledges  two  other  varieties  of  imagination,
namely sensory and cognitive imagination.
24 The notion of imaginative project comes from Williams (1976). Ima-
ginings  are  particular  mental  states,  whereas  imaginative  projects
can bind several imaginings in a coherent endeavour of imaginative
world-making. The distinction is relevant even when a single imagin-
ing is at stake. Typically, an imaginative project will impose con-
straints, e.g., of an intentional or stipulative sort, on what is the case
in the imagined world in addition to what is explicitly represented in
an imagining.
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We have pointed out  that  they should be
considered as two sub-varieties of objective
imagination, insofar as they both re-create
external  experiences  (respectively,  the  five
senses and at least some occurrent beliefs).
• Fourth, we suggested, more tentatively, that
subjective imagination too may be further
divided. There would be, on the one hand,
the imaginative re-creation of  non-cognitive
non-sensory  internal  experiences  (e.g.,
proprioception, agentive experiences, intro-
spection,  feeling  pain)  and,  on  the  other
hand, the imaginative re-creation of cognit-
ive non-sensory  internal  experiences  (e.g.,
ascent routines).
Of course, more has to be said about the pre-
cise domain of experiential states that can be
re-created  in  the  imagination,  beyond  those
that we have introduced in this essay. Another
question  is  whether  there  is  something  like
non-experiential imagination. It might well be
that, at the end of the journey, every type of
imagining can be shown to belong to experien-
tial  imagination.  This  would have to include
the state of imagining being a descendant of
Napoleon,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  Walton
rates  as  non-experiential.  For  instance,  one
might suggest that it is the state of imagining
believing that one is a descendant of Napoleon
(understood as representing in imagination a
world in which one is a descendant of Napo-
leon).
Eventually,  an  analysis  of  experiential
imagination  on  the  lines  suggested  above
should  throw  light  not  only  on  imagination
per se,  but  on connected phenomena.  As we
have tried to illustrate, we believe that tradi-
tional and contemporary discussions about the
relationship between imagination and possibil-
ity, the nature of mindreading, and the ability
to imagine being someone else,  often rely on
oversimplified conceptions of imagination, and
that a more fine-grained taxonomy of experi-
ential imagination is needed. We suspect that
our  taxonomy is  beneficial  to  still  other  ap-
plications of the notion of imagination, but we
have to leave the task of justifying our suspi-
cion to another occasion.
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